Jerusalem News (19 October, 2014, 25 Tishrei, 5775)
Duration: 10.36 minutes. To Read Articles Please Scroll Down!
Contents:
1. Ephraim Betrays the Jews of Israel!
Britain's House of Commons votes 274-12 in favor of symbolic motion that stands as initial stage of UK recognition of a Palestinian state.
2. Israel's Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean
by Efraim Inbar
3. Study: Without Holocaust, there would be no haredim today
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1. Ephraim Betrays the Jews of Israel!
Britain's House of Commons votes 274-12 in favor of symbolic motion that stands as initial stage of UK recognition of a Palestinian state.
http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Watch-British-parliament-holds-symbolic-vote-on-Palestine-status-378787
Britain's House of Commons voted [October 13, 2014] in favor of recognizing a Palestinian state late Monday in a move that will not alter the government's stance on the issue, but that carries symbolic value for Palestinians in their pursuit of statehood.
Lawmakers in Britain's lower house of parliament voted by 274 to 12 to pass a non-binding motion stating: "That this House believes that the Government should recognize the state of Palestine alongside the state of Israel as a contribution to securing a negotiated two-state solution."
Britain does not classify "Palestine" as a state, but says it could do so at any time if it believed it would help peace efforts between the Palestinians and Israel. Government ministers were told to abstain and the non-binding vote will not force Britain to recognise a Palestinian state.
Nearly 50 MPs were in the chamber to hear pro-Palestinian Labor Backbencher Grahame Morris open the four hour debate which he said was a chance for the UK to atone for its historic mistakes - a clear reference to the Balfour Declaration.
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2. Israel's Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean
by Efraim Inbar
Middle East Quarterly
Fall 2014 (view PDF)
http://www.meforum.org/4804/israel-challenges-in-the-eastern-mediterranean
![[]](http://www.meforum.org/pics/large/616.jpg)
Extracts:
About 90 percent of Israel's foreign trade is carried out via the Mediterranean Sea. The East Mediterranean is also important in terms of energy transit. Close to 5 percent of global oil supply and 15 percent of global liquefied natural gas travels via the Suez Canal while Turkey hosts close to 6 percent of the global oil trade via the Bosporus Straits and two international pipelines.
About 90 percent of Israel's foreign trade is carried out via the Mediterranean Sea, making freedom of navigation in this area critical for the Jewish state's economic well-being. Moreover, the newly found gas fields offshore could transform Israel into an energy independent country and a significant exporter of gas, yet these developments are tied to its ability to secure free maritime passage and to defend the discovered hydrocarbon fields. While the recent regional turmoil has improved Israel's strategic environment by weakening its Arab foes, the East Mediterranean has become more problematic due to an increased Russian presence, Turkish activism, the potential for more terrorism and conflict over energy, and the advent of a Cypriot-Greek-Israeli axis. The erosion of the state order around the Mediterranean also brings to the fore Islamist forces with a clear anti-Western agenda, thus adding a civilizational dimension to the discord.[1]
Close to 5 percent of global oil supply and 15 percent of global liquefied natural gas travels via the Suez Canal while Turkey hosts close to 6 percent of the global oil trade via the Bosporus Straits and two international pipelines. The discovery of new oil and gas deposits off the coasts of Israel, Gaza, and Cyprus and potential for additional discoveries off Syria and Lebanon, is a promising energy development.
Breakdown of the U.S. Security Architecture
The naval presence of the U.S. Sixth Fleet was unrivalled in the post-Cold War period, and Washington maintained military and political dominance in the East Mediterranean.[2] Washington also managed the region through a web of alliances with regional powers. Most prominent were two trilateral relationships, which had their origins in the Cold War: U.S.-Turkey-Israel and U.S.-Egypt-Israel.[3] This security architecture has broken down.
...Turkey supports Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot; helps Iran evade sanctions; assists Sunni Islamists moving into Syria and mulls an invasion of Syria; propagates anti-U.S. and anti-Semitic conspiracies while the regime displays increasing authoritarianism at home. Moreover, Turkey's NATO partnership has become problematic, particularly after a Chinese firm was contracted to build a long-range air and anti-missile defense architecture.[6]
Turkish policy, fueled by Ottoman and Islamist impulses, has led to an activist approach toward the Middle East and also to strains in the relationship with Israel. This became evident following the May 2010 attempt by a Turkish vessel, the Mavi Marmara, to break the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza. In October 2010, Turkey's national security council even identified Israel as one of the country's main threats in its official policy document, the "Red Book." These developments fractured one of the foundations upon which U.S. policy has rested in the East Mediterranean.
![[]](http://www.meforum.org/pics/large/618.jpg)
North of Israel, along the Mediterranean coast, sits Lebanon, a state dominated by the radical Shiite Hezbollah. Beirut has already laid claim to some of the Israeli-found offshore gas fields, shown above. Moreover, Syria, an enemy of Israel and long-time ally of Iran, exerts considerable influence in Lebanon.
Drained by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and blessed with new energy finds, Washington does not want to get dragged into additional conflicts in a Middle East that no longer seems central to its interests. As it edges toward energy independence, Washington is apparently losing interest in the East Mediterranean and the adjacent Middle East.
North of Israel, along the Mediterranean coast, sits Lebanon, a state dominated by the radical Shiite Hezbollah. It has already laid claim to some of the Israeli-found offshore gas fields. Moreover, Syria, an enemy of Israel and long-time ally of Iran, exerts considerable influence in Lebanon. The Assad regime remains in power, but any Syrian successor regime could be Islamist and anti-Western.
Further on the East Mediterranean coastline is AKP-ruled Turkey. A combination of Turkish nationalism, neo-Ottoman nostalgia, and Islamist-jihadist impulses has pushed Ankara away from a pro-Western foreign orientation toward an aggressive posture on several regional issues. Turkey is interested in gaining control over the maritime gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean, which would limit its energy dependence on Russia and Iran and help fulfill its ambitions to serve as an energy bridge to the West. This puts Ankara at loggerheads with Nicosia and Jerusalem, which share an interest in developing the hydrocarbon fields in their exclusive economic zones and exporting gas to energy-thirsty Europe. Indeed, Ankara also flexed its naval muscles by threatening to escort flotillas trying to break the Israeli blockade on Gaza.
West of Turkey is Greece, a democratic, Western state with a stake in the protection of the Greek Cypriots from Muslim domination. However, it has limited military ability to parry the Turkish challenge alone and is wracked by economic problems. Many East Mediterranean states also would likely favor the return of Cyprus to Turkish (and Muslim) rule. This preference introduces a civilizational aspect to the emerging balance of power.
Russian warships arrive at the Syrian port city of Tartus, January 8, 2014. The Russians have retained a naval base at Tartus and have gradually increased fleet size and stepped up patrols in the East Mediterranean, roughly coinciding with the escalation of the Syrian civil war. Moscow also gained full access to a Cypriot port and recently announced the establishment of a Mediterranean naval task force "on a permanent basis."
There is now a power vacuum in the East Mediterranean and an uncertain future. Several developments are noteworthy: a resurgence of Russian influence, the potential for Turkish aggression, the emergence of an Israeli-Greek-Cypriot axis, an enhanced terrorist threat, greater Iranian ability to project power in the region, and the potential for wars over gas fields.
Russia: The power vacuum makes it easier for Moscow to recapture some of its lost influence after the end of the Cold War. While U.S. and European navies in the region have steadily declined for years as this theater has been considered of diminishing importance, Russia has retained its Tartus naval base on the Syrian coast and has gradually improved its fleet size and stepped up patrols in the East Mediterranean, roughly coinciding with the escalation of the Syrian civil war.[16] Moscow's new military footprint in the East Mediterranean has been underscored by multiple Russian naval exercises. During his visit to the Black Sea Fleet in February 2013, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stressed that the "Mediterranean region was the core of all essential dangers to Russia's national interests" and that continued fallout from the Arab upheavals increased the importance of the region. Shortly after, he announced the establishment of a naval task force in the Mediterranean "on a permanent basis."[17]
Moscow also gained full access to a Cypriot port.[18] A member of the European Union but not NATO, and painfully aware that the West is not likely to offer a credible guarantee against potential Turkish aggression, Nicosia has come to consider Moscow a power able to provide a modicum of deterrence against Ankara.[19]
Russian diplomacy and material support have also been crucial to keeping Syria's Bashar al-Assad in power, making Moscow a tacit ally of Iran.[20] No less important, Russia has increased its leverage in Egypt the most important Arab state following the military coup. According to many reporrts, a large arms deal, to the tune of U.S. $2-3 billion, and naval services at the port of Alexandria, were discussed between the two countries at the beginning of 2014. If these deals do indeed materialize, this would represent an important change in Egyptian policy. It is not clear whether the Western powers fully understand the strategic significance of Egypt moving closer to Russia.
Despite its problems with Muslim radicals at home, Moscow has also maintained good relations with Hamas. In contrast to most of the international community, which considers Hamas a terrorist organization, in 2006, the Russian government invited a Hamas delegation to Moscow for talks.[21] In 2010, together with Turkey, Russia even called for bringing Hamas into the diplomatic process attempting to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.[22]
Russian support has been crucial to keeping Syria's Assad in power, making Moscow a tacit ally of Iran.
discovered offshore energy fields.[23] In July 2012, Russian president Vladimir Putin visited Israel to discuss the gas fields, among other things. In December 2013, Moscow signed a 25-year energy deal with Syria that opens the way for its eventual move into the gas-rich East Mediterranean.[24]
Turkey: The Russian encroachment has been paralleled by greater Turkish assertiveness. Under certain conditions, Ankara may be tempted to capitalize on its conventional military superiority to force issues by military action in several arenas, including the Aegean, Cyprus, Syria, and, perhaps, Iraq. The potential disintegration of Syria and the possible establishment of an independent Greater Kurdistan could be incentives for Turkish intervention. The collapse of the AKP's earlier foreign policy, dubbed "zero problems" with Turkey's neighbors, could push Ankara into open confrontation. Aggressive Russian behavior in Crimea could reinforce such tendencies.
Similarly, Turkey's appetite for energy and aspiration to become an energy bridge to Europe could lead to aggressive behavior. Turkish warships have harassed vessels prospecting for oil and gas off Cyprus. [25] Cyprus is also the main station for a Turkish desired pipeline taking Levant Basin gas to Turkey for export to Europe. Ankara might even be tempted to complete its conquest of Cyprus, begun when it invaded and occupied the northern part of the island in 1974.
Ankara has embarked on military modernization and has ambitious procurement plans. Turkish naval power is the largest in the East Mediterranean.[26] In March 2012, then-navy commander Admiral Murat Bilgel outlined Turkey's strategic objective "to operate not only in the littorals but also on the high seas," with high seas referring to the East Mediterranean. The December 2013 decision to purchase a large 27,500-ton landing dock vessel capable of transporting multiple tanks, helicopters, and more than a thousand troops, reflects its desire to project naval strength in the region.[27]
Wars over gas fields: The discovery of gas fields in the East Mediterranean could potentially escalate tensions in this increasingly volatile region. Competing claims to the gas fields by Israel's former ally Turkey as well as by its neighbor Lebanon (still in a de jure state of war) have precipitated a buildup of naval forces in the Levant basin by a number of states, including Russia. Israel's wells and the naval presence protecting them also offer new targets at sea to its longstanding, non-state enemies, Hezbollah and Hamas.
Conscious of these threats, the Israel Defense Forces chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, has approved the navy's plan to add four offshore patrol vessels.[40] Israeli defense circles hope that Israel's expanding navy, combined with continuous improvement of land and air assets and increasing cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, will give pause to any regional actor that would consider turning the Mediterranean Sea into the next great field of battle. Indeed, the Israeli navy is now preparing to defend the gas field offshore of Israel.[41]
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3. Study: Without Holocaust, there would be no haredim today
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4578665,00.html
Researcher finds there were only several thousand yeshiva students in Europe before World War II. Survivors of Nazi genocide realized they must fight to restore world of Torah.
Moshe Glantz, Rafi Barbiro
Published: 10.12.14, 00:37 / Israel Jewish Scene
Extracts:
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A study conducted by Dr. Michal Shaul reveals that the haredi world's development and increased power in the past 60 years was actually the result of the Holocaust. The data she compiled during her doctorate are now presented in a new book called "Beauty for Ashes."
According to Dr. Shaul, the world of Torah was in a process of disappearing until the Holocaust, and if it wasn't for the dreadful disaster suffered by the Jewish people, it's possible that there would be no ultra-Orthodox world today.
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"In the early 20th century, the world of Torah was in a deep crisis," she says. "Jewish Orthodoxy was nearly extinct. It was consumed by the Jewish Enlightenment movement, Zionism and Socialism, and there was a major shift towards those movements. According to estimates, there were only several thousand yeshiva students in Eastern Europe before the war."
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It was the huge destruction which caused Holocaust survivors to take urgent action, she says. "They realized that it was 'to be or not to be,'" she explains. When the survivors saw that almost the entire world of Torah had gone up in flames after the war, and upon the establishment of the secular State of Israel, religious leaders and common people came to the conclusion that they to fight to restore the world of Torah.
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"It's likely that without the Holocaust, the world of Torah would have become extinct," Dr. Shaul believes.Â